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1 
The Downside of Digital Inclusion: Expectations and Experiences of Privacy and 
Surveillance among Marginal Internet Users 
 
Although digital inclusion research has come a long way since its initial techno-
deterministic assumptions, very few studies in this domain have addressed the extent to 
which pervasive digital tracking and targeting, by both state and corporate actors, might 
contribute to conditions of unfairness and inequality in society. In the United States, this 
gap is particularly pronounced as technology companies assume a greater share of 
responsibility in bridging the so-called digital divide. Corporate-supported digital 
inclusion programs do not have a reputation of protecting or informing users who may be 
targeted by automatable, algorithmically driven processes that predict user behavior 
(hereafter, “data profiling”).1 These efforts to provide digital literacy and public access to 
the Internet and digital devices (“broadband adoption”) fail to engage issues of users’ 
digital privacy or the appropriateness of how digital information is shared and flows 
(Nissenbaum, 2010) and neglect topics of surveillance and the collection and monitoring 
of personal information for the purposes of social control (Gandy, 2009; Lyon, 2001; 
Marx, 1985).  
While all citizens and consumers are affected by shifts in the meaning and nature 
of privacy and surveillance, members of underserved communities—that is, groups that 
have been historically marginalized, such as poor people, people of color, immigrants, 
and indigenous peoples confronting social and economic injustice (Fraser, 2003)—face 
greater risk than most: in the process of data profiling members of marginalized groups, 
corporations and the state can exacerbate existing conditions of inequity. From data 
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collection to data sharing to data analysis, members of historically marginalized groups 
are at risk of being stereotyped, exploited, or alienated. As members of marginalized 
groups are tracked, categorized, and targeted, corporations and states can use and reuse 
these data profiles, creating a “feedback loop of injustice” (Hamid Khan in Bond et al., 
2014). 
Beginning with the premise that community anchor institutions play a critical role 
in shaping individual and community expectations of broadband technologies (Dailey et 
al., 2010), the current study peers into broadband adoption programs at community-based 
and public institutions (“digital inclusion providers”) in order to understand the ways in 
which privacy and surveillance issues emerge and are engaged in these settings. It 
focuses on marginal Internet users (or “marginal users”), which refers to members of 
historically marginalized groups typically targeted by digital literacy programs. How do 
marginal Internet users negotiate norms, expectations, and practices regarding 
information flows when learning about broadband technologies? By presenting the 
findings of a mixed-methods study of digital inclusion programs, this article sheds light 
on the nature and meaning of digital inclusion in an era of pervasive tracking and 
targeting. It demonstrates tensions between the promise of broadband opportunities and 
the threat of inappropriate and asymmetrical flows of information, and in so doing, 
identifies a policy opportunity to guard against privacy and data profiling problems faced 
by individuals, including those with low levels of technical savvy. 
Overview: Digital Inclusion’s Disconnect from Privacy and Profiling Concerns 
Many policymakers and advocates for digital inclusion hold an uncomplicated 
view of broadband as a pathway to opportunity for the underserved (Selwyn, 2004). In 
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2009, for example, the United States Congress established the Broadband Technology 
Opportunities Program (BTOP), pouring approximately $450 million into public 
computing and digital literacy programs across the country to address disparities in 
access and use and to “spur job creation and stimulate long-term economic growth and 
opportunity” (U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), 2009a: 1). Broadband was seen as having 
“transformative power” to lay the foundation for people’s “long-term prosperity” (Seifert, 
2009), and Vice President Joseph Biden stated that the programs served as a “down 
payment on the President’s commitment to bringing educational and economic benefits 
of the Internet to all communities” (Biden in Kang, 2009). 
As President Obama’s second term neared, the stakes of broadband adoption 
remained high, even as BTOP’s end became apparent. The president stressed the 
imperative of “connecting every part of America to the digital age” (Obama, 2011). 
Government services, such as those offered by the Affordable Care Act, became online-
only options (Super, 2014), and the job market became more digitally dependent. By 
2012, 80 percent of Fortune 500 companies, including Walmart, Comcast, and 
McDonald’s, accepted job applications online only (Science Magazine, 2013).  
The question of digital privacy 
Meanwhile, digital privacy “defenders” have argued for adequate privacy 
protections in the provision of universal broadband. They worry that the capacity of 
broadband-enabled technologies to collect and exchange consumers’ sensitive personal 
data poses “risks to consumer privacy” and require remedial measures in order to 
“increase consumer trust and truly achieve broadband’s potential” (Center for Democracy 
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and Technology, et al., 2010: 1). Many privacy rights advocates routinely criticize 
technology industry players, such as Google, Microsoft, and Comcast, all of which derive 
enormous profit from invasive collection, sharing, and analysis of personal data (Chester, 
2007).  
In the privacy field, researchers and advocates highlight practices that leave users 
in the dark about how corporations collect, share, and analyze user data with impunity. 
For example, Narayanan’s (2011) research details five ways in which third parties (e.g., 
sites like ad networks that a user involuntarily visits when connecting to a first party 
content provider) compromise user privacy. Risks arise when first party content providers 
sell user identities to third parties for a fee, or when first parties leak user identities to 
third parties by including user names in “http referrers,” the addresses of webpages that 
third parties link to. To the latter, Mayer and Mitchell (2012) demonstrated user name or 
ID leakages in 61 percent of the top 250 websites (ranked by the Web traffic analysis 
company, Alexa).
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 Other privacy scholars, like MacDonald and Cranor (2008) and 
Acquisti and Grossklags (2008), point to the inadequacy of notice-and-consent and other 
transparency requirements, which fail to inform users about how companies collect, 
analyze, or share user data with third parties.  
While the type of user examined in the above studies tends to be an “average 
consumer” and the privacy intrusions described can befall any individual, some privacy 
research seems to suggest that consumers with low socioeconomic status face greater 
challenges in confronting privacy and surveillance issues. Turow, Meltzer, and 
Feldman’s study (2005) found that survey respondents with only a high school diploma 
performed worse than graduate degree holders in answering knowledge questions about 
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privacy. Meanwhile, a Pew Research Center study (2014) reported that adults with 
college degrees were more likely than other populations to “check up on their own digital 
footprints” (p. 21). 
Digital automation of unfairness 
A handful of researchers have begun to consider consequences of surveillance 
technologies for historically marginalized communities. Gandy (2009) described a 
process of digitally enabled cumulative disadvantage: automatable statistical analyses of 
the behavior of particular populations (e.g., African Americans and Latinos as non-
affluent consumers who prefer “low brow culture”) inform and justify exclusionary 
policies and practices (e.g., targeting low-quality news products to African Americans 
and Latinos which in turn excludes them from representation in and access to a market 
for high quality news). Fisher (2009), Gangadharan (2012), and Pasquale (2014) studied 
lenders, data brokers, online platforms, and other actors in the data supply chain and their 
use of digital tracking and algorithmic analysis to identify and target low-credit ranking 
consumers for risky subprime loans. 
While the above scholars worry about data collection and use based on accurate 
data, others—including those outside of academia—have focused on error in data-driven 
systems and their impact on the underserved. For instance, several states operate 
computerized welfare assistance systems programmed with overly stringent criteria, 
resulting in denial of services to legitimate, qualifying applicants (Woodhouse, 2015; 
Eubanks, 2013). Meanwhile, E-verify, an automated system of employment verification 
run by the federal government, routinely misidentifies people with non-Caucasian 
sounding names as ineligible to work in the United States (Leadership Conference on 
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Civil and Human Rights, 2014).  
Additionally, as Barocas and Selbst (2016) explain, data profiling of underserved 
populations can arise unintentionally. This occurs when data inputs correlate with 
particular attributes of the underserved and when data analysis is biased by these proxy 
inputs.  
Research linking digital inclusion to digital harms 
Where are digital inclusion researchers and advocates in debates about the 
dangers of digital society? The few examples of government and civil society survey 
research specific to digital inclusion do not have consistent views on the importance of 
privacy and safety concerns in broadband non-adoption. While the surveys conducted by 
NTIA (2009b, 2011) and Pew Research Center (2013b) ranked privacy and security 
concerns low on a list of reasons for non-adoption in comparison to other factors like 
relevance or cost, an FCC study (Horrigan and U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), 2010) showed that nonusers prioritize such risks as a third reason, 
after cost and comfort.
3
  
On the scholarly front, two studies address privacy and surveillance within the 
context of digital inclusion programs. Viseu, Clement, and Aspinall’s (2004) qualitative 
study of individuals considered to be “on the wrong side of the digital divide” in Canada 
revealed that interviewees felt a high degree of concern for user privacy, though an 
equally pronounced sense of resignation to the inevitability of diminished digital privacy.  
Eubanks’ (2011) ethnography of participants in a community program designed to 
bridge the digital divide demonstrated that limited or lack of access to the Internet or 
computers for poor, working class women was a myth. Whether under electronic 
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surveillance at work or in the welfare office, women’s lives were suffused with digital 
technology over which they had little control. This manner of digital inclusion, Eubanks 
argued, affected poor and working women’s material status, emotional well-being, and 
political efficacy. Employers deployed monitoring systems that tracked worker activities 
and prevented women from organizing for better workplace conditions. Case workers in 
the welfare office relied on computer-driven systems that housed records of women’s 
personal behavior and automated processes of ineligibility. 
Taken together, Eubanks’ and Viseu et al.’s works raise several instructive points 
for this study. First, digital inclusion efforts do not offer critical perspective on optimistic 
statements made by advocates of programs such as BTOP. Though access to computers 
and the Internet can provide opportunities to members of marginalized communities, 
opportunities come with risks, including privacy intrusions and social control due to 
surveillance. Sometimes risks originate from the technologies themselves; in other cases, 
they extend existing social practices of disciplining poor people and people of color.  
Second, privacy concerns do not show up in studies of non-adoption, because 
many marginal users adopt broadband by necessity, in spite of privacy or surveillance 
concerns. Few people have the option of staying offline. As Eubanks’ study 
demonstrates, the marginal Internet user is embedded in information and communication 
infrastructures regardless of personal choice, means, or capabilities. 
Third, community anchor institutions play an integral role in shaping marginal 
users’ expectations of broadband technologies. At public computer centers, public 
libraries, and other community spaces, marginal users negotiate norms, expectations, and 
practices regarding broadband technologies, including ones related to privacy intrusions 
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or surveillance. 
These points raise several research questions:  
 First, what concerns about sharing of information and about privacy or 
surveillance are arising within the context of learning how to use the 
Internet and computers?  
 Second, in what ways do marginal Internet users face risks related to 
information sharing?  
 Third, in what ways do these privacy risks deter from perceived and actual 
benefits of using the Internet? 
A Study of Privacy and Surveillance in Digital Literacy Settings 
Background: A resource gap 
A review of one of the field’s most prominent resources (digitalliteracy.gov), 
conducted during the qualitative study described below, provides important context to the 
study of privacy and surveillance concerns arising in digital literacy organizations. 
Whether due to benign neglect or intentional oversight,
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 practitioners contributing to the 
site largely failed to address topics concerning the nature and appropriateness of 
information flows or information asymmetries.  
Established in 2011, and curated by the NTIA, digitalliteracy.gov features 
hundreds of educational resources posted by government agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and corporations. In January 2012 and then again in March 2013, the 
author examined “Topics,” “Skills,” “Resource Formats,” and “Audiences” on 
digitalliteracy.gov, finding that none of the resources grouped under these content 
headings included privacy or surveillance-related material.  
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Inspection of all the resources listed on the site yielded a very small number of 
privacy-related materials, and none related to surveillance or data profiling. In January 
2012, eight resources (out of 452) pertained to privacy. Most focused on privacy settings 
for social network sites and safeguards for children online. In March 2013, the number of 
resources that featured privacy information increased to 11 (out of 477 or just over 2 
percent). While a number of resources concerned youth safety (a total of 42 in March 
2013) and digital security (a total of 20 in March 2013), digital literacy programs ignored 
corporate and government surveillance or tracking technologies altogether. Overall, the 
snapshot of digitalliteracy.gov illustrates a dearth of educational matter concerning 
tracking, targeting, and information flows. 
Field study design: A mixed methods approach 
The study described here took a mixed methods approach to examining four 
digital literacy institutions serving marginal Internet users. It combined participant 
observation of students in the classroom with participatory action research to arrive at an 
understanding of privacy and surveillance. Participant observation, a technique 
successfully used in studying community technology initiatives (Kvasny, 2006), was 
chosen for its unobtrusiveness in discovering privacy and surveillance concerns. 
Participatory action research was chosen for its emphasis on reciprocity and ethical 
engagement when studying sensitive issues with communities, particularly historically 
marginalized ones (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994). Collaborative work entailed the co-
creation of privacy learning tools and involved large and small group discussions and, at 
the behest of one of the participating organizations, one-on-one structured interviews, all 
of which provided insights and stories of staff working on the front lines with marginal 
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Internet users (see also Budka et al., 2006; Eubanks, 2011; Masucci and Gilbert, 2011).  
During an eighteen-month period (between 2012 and 2013) in major northeastern 
cities in the US, the author worked with a citywide computer training center, a senior 
center, a local social movement organization, and a large public library system.
5
 Funding 
for these institutions’ programs came primarily from state sources, though technology 
companies had contributed additional program support at two of the organizations 
studied. All four organizations predominantly serve members of low-income 
communities of color, including both American citizens and immigrants. An institutional 
review board required the author to obtain partnership agreements from each 
collaborating organization, written consent from staff members, and oral consent from 
adult learners interested in participating in the study. Study participants were given the 
option of attending other classes, if they wished to opt out.  
In this time period, a variety of artifacts were collected for analysis: 
 A mixture of group and individual-level discussions related to the 
generation of learning tools, involving more than 100 staff members (each 
of whom, by conservative estimates, interacts with at least 40 marginal 
users, or a total of 4,000 users in a given year)  
 Seventeen class observations (40 adult students and 5 teachers); and 
 Three privacy learning tools, coproduced by staff and the author. 
The author used a combination of techniques to capture data. For example, the 
author recorded and transcribed interview material,
6
 did direct transcription of group 
discussions both small and large, produced summaries of “working group” meetings that 
were then shared with staff members, and took notes of and documented classroom 
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activities, including lectures, discussion, teaching and learning techniques, and classroom 
handouts.  
Generally guided by Christians and Carey’s (1989) criteria for competent 
qualitative studies, the author then analyzed the material, looking for common themes 
that highlighted values and practices pertaining to information flows and their 
appropriateness. Wherever possible, the author triangulated between perceptions or 
experiences revealed by marginal Internet users and those recounted by staff who worked 
with them.  
Findings: Marginal users’ expectations and experiences 
Group discussions, interview materials, and observation of marginal users yielded 
insights into how the dream of broadband opportunities interacts and sometimes clashes 
with digital privacy and surveillance concerns. Marginal users believed that broadband 
adoption would improve basic facets of their lives. With some exceptions (noted below), 
marginal users felt digital technologies would help them find a job, assist children with 
their schooling, connect with friends and family, or simply learn something new. To the 
question, “Does anyone know what the Internet is used for?” the majority of answers of 
students at the library focused on “finding information” and “look[ing] for a job.” At the 
computer training center, students described the Internet similarly as “a place where you 
find information” or “find a job,” as well as a tool that lets you stay home “to go 
shopping or do your banking.” As one individual at the senior center remarked, “If you 
don’t know the computer, you won’t know what’s going on in the world or any place 
else.” 
But analysis of the activities and dialogue in these digital literacy settings also 
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reveals that marginal Internet users’ privacy and surveillance concerns are central to their 
early encounters with and expectations of the Internet and computers, though formally 
absent from digital literacy instruction. Moreover, the digital tools and platforms 
available to marginal users and the practices they learned exposed them to potential 
harms of digital tracking and targeting. While informal problem-solving around privacy 
or surveillance arose in the classroom, solutions available to marginal users did not 
appear to adequately meet their needs or concerns. 
• Low expectations of privacy, high expectations of surveillance!
• Anxiety about government’s prying eyes!
• Recognition of commercial surveillance!
• Appeals for personal cybersecurity!
Expression of unique 
privacy and surveillance 
concerns!
• Access by individuals, access to individuals!
• Following duplicitous leads!
• Reputation and dignity!
Exposure to potential 
harms!
• Lack of meaningful privacy choices!
• Push back and resignation!
Little access to adequate 
solutions!
    Theme! ! ! !         !   Findings!
Figure 1. Privacy, surveillance themes among marginal Internet users !
 
Theme #1: Expression of unique privacy and surveillance concerns 
Low expectations of privacy, high expectations of surveillance. Though optimism 
was apparent, marginal users expressed concerns about privacy and surveillance in ad 
hoc ways. The threat of digital surveillance and privacy intrusions contributed to their 
anxieties about broadband.  
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For most of the marginal users observed in the classroom or recollected by staff, 
privacy was viewed as a luxury, not a right. At the library, this concern was most 
pronounced. Staff mentioned how marginal users felt watched, were watched, or seemed 
as vulnerable as “sheep for slaughter” with respect to protecting personal data. Marginal 
users’ vulnerabilities appeared most acute when applying to and maintaining eligibility in 
welfare programs, often at the last minute. Not only did users give up intimate details 
about themselves in exchange for welfare support, they also shared intimate information 
with staff members, such as email passwords, credit card numbers, or social security 
numbers. Much in the same way that the poor and working women in Eubanks’ study 
(2012) had to routinely divulge information to caseworkers inputting information into 
computer terminals, marginal users studied here had little opportunity to limit 
information flows about themselves. 
Anxiety about government’s prying eyes. Marginal users worried about 
government surveillance, mostly stemming from their local experiences with social 
welfare systems. In some cases, users believed that the digital literacy provider and 
government entities were complicit in surveillance. For example, at the public library, 
users could not access unemployment websites, prompting patrons to fault the library for 
censorship (and not the Department of Labor and its server problems).  
Staff regularly received questions about what the library knew about user 
behavior, such as whether the library truly erased a user’s computer usage history at the 
conclusion of a public terminal session. At the computer training center, instructors 
reported disinterest in a classroom exercise that involved emailing a local government 
agency or official. As one instructor said, “A lot of students are hesitant to write to the 
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mayor or a government official… [P]eople are afraid they’re going to get on a list. They 
don’t want to get into any trouble.” Because of low participation rates, the center made 
the exercise optional.  
Surprisingly, marginal users did not raise the topic of government surveillance in 
the context of national security. The lack of salience of privacy versus national security 
concerns among marginal Internet users suggests government surveillance holds 
particular meaning for marginal populations. As others have written (Gilliom, 2001, 
Eubanks, 2011), this meaning ties to a long history of suspicion and monitoring of 
historically marginalized communities by hegemonic powers. 
Recognition of commercial surveillance. Marginal users worried to a lesser degree 
about commercial surveillance, as compared with welfare state surveillance, though for 
complex reasons. When students spoke about commercial activities, they expressed 
concern found in survey research on e-commerce and lower-income populations (Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, 2010; see also Pew Internet & American Life Project, 
2008): users did not trust the safety of websites and felt hesitant to use a credit card 
online, unless they had a pre-paid credit card.  
In general, students rarely learned how to shop online, though occasionally users 
would exclaim, “I heard you can get good deals on the Internet.” When instructors 
exposed students to e-commerce or discussed it in class, or when staff advised marginal 
users in one-on-one contexts, students received little guidance about reliable sites (versus 
predatory or disingenuous ones). Students acquired little information about 
advertisements, and many struggled to differentiate between advertisements and content 
online. At the computer center, students learned that search engines listed sponsored links 
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or advertisements in addition to search results, a process which instructors framed as 
“more informative.”  
Marginal Internet users seemed to intuit the reasons for targeting and tracking, 
despite not knowing about data profiling. At the library, when pop-up ads appeared 
during a search engine exercise, students experienced advertisers’ attempts to grab their 
attention. In response, one student commented, “Nothing is free in this country.” Topics 
such as recommendation engines did not get addressed, though at the senior center, both 
students and former students-turned-unpaid volunteers expressed dissatisfaction with 
niche marketing generally. As one woman said, “We all are targeted, because 
[companies] do the demographics. They find out who’s in the neighborhood, what 
schools—just a whole lot of information. If you are not in one system, you’re in another.” 
Consistent with other studies of poor people (Eubanks, 2011; Gilliom, 2001; Piven and 
Cloward, 1971), marginal Internet users felt concerned with the ways in which the 
marketplace and society saw them as second-class citizens. They conveyed a sense of 
inevitability at the prospect of being “taken for a ride” or targeted. 
Pleas for personal cybersecurity. Marginal users’ concern for “all the bad things 
that might happen to you on the Internet” (see FCC, 2010) connected to their desire for a 
safer Internet experience. They tended to raise questions or share examples of the 
inappropriateness of information sharing alongside those related to the safety or 
protection of information online.  
In classroom settings at all four organizations, marginal users spoke about identity 
theft. Most of these stories related to unauthorized use of credit cards and bank accounts, 
though on occasion, users found themselves the target of phishing attacks. Fraudsters 
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filled inboxes with messages that lured marginal users with requests for money to, for 
instance, purportedly help a long lost friend or pay an outstanding parking fine. At the 
computer center, students spoke at length about Chinese hackers featured in news reports, 
while at the senior center, older adults worried about predators stalking children. As one 
user said, “The whole Internet is like the Wild West. There’s a lot of bad people out there 
who are intentionally bad, [and] you just can’t see them.” The sentiment echoes how 
some policymakers and advocates have begun connecting the idea of personal 
cybersecurity to the protection of personal privacy (Gangadharan et al., 2013). 
Theme #2: Exposure to potential harms 
Access by individuals, access to individuals. Contrary to characterizations by 
some Internet researchers that public Internet access affords individuals anonymity (e.g., 
since the computer is not tied to a specific individual; see Pew Research Center, 2013a), 
users on public computer terminals are not immune to tracking. Computer terminals were 
configured for Web-based email, and staff taught webmail to marginal users in the 
classroom. Instructors advised students to always log out of Web-based email or other 
services at the end of a session, but not after logging into other services and platforms. As 
Libert (2015) demonstrated, a permanent log-in state facilitates the creation of data 
profiles, such as in the case of health-related websites that unobtrusively share behavioral 
data (through referrer urls) with third parties featured on those sites (e.g., a Facebook 
“Like” button). 
Several of the services introduced to marginal users, in particular employment 
websites like hotjobs.com and Monster.com, required real-name registration. As 
mentioned above, real-name registration facilitates tracking within a particular site, and 
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can involve leakage of user data to first and third parties analyzing referrer urls (Mayer, 
2012). In this sense, broadband adoption means access by individuals to the Internet, as 
well as access to individuals by different Internet services and platforms. 
Following duplicitous leads. When learning about and accessing broadband, 
marginal users divulged personal details in commercial contexts that may facilitate 
harmful targeting or predatory data profiling.  
At the library, one user tried a “free” resume service advertised in search results. 
Under pressure to create a resume for a prospective employer, the user entered personal 
information including job history and contact information, prompted page by page by the 
site. On the last page, the service demanded money from the user in order to receive the 
complete resume. Lacking funds, the user abandoned the effort, left without a resume at 
the price of his personal information now in possession by the service. Another example 
revealed at the computer center involved an individual who clicked a link in an email 
about job searches. The link prompted the student to enter date of birth, address, and 
phone number, leading to incessant calls asking the student to register for a distance 
education course. Another individual spoke about Everest, a continuing education 
company that did frequent targeting: “It’s a scam coming up all the time. And that’s the 
price of using the Internet.” These cases echo job and education scams cited by regulators 
and journalists (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2012; Wofford, 2013).  
Reputation and dignity. Marginal users appeared to have limited control over the 
construction of digital reputations. The lack of control pertains not only to activities of 
the marginal individuals as they become active users or adopters, but also to their “pre-
adoption” actions or behavior captured and indexed online. For example, at the computer 
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training center, during a class exercise, an instructor Googled the name of a student, and 
the person’s arrest record from twenty years prior came up as a top result. While neither 
false nor duplicitous, the search had a destabilizing effect, demonstrating to the user that 
she did not manage her own digital reputation. The instructor later viewed the experience 
as an opportunity to teach students “that there’s information out there about them.” 
Though marginal users look forward to expressing themselves and engaging 
online, Internet services and platforms play an influential role in shaping how individuals 
become visible online. Search engines, for example, can function as gate-keepers, but 
both the opacity of companies’ proprietary algorithms (Pasquale, 2014) and the complex 
ways in which user behavior “trains” algorithms to produce particular kinds of outcomes 
(Hardt, 2014) make it difficult for a marginal user to understand information presented to 
her—and in this case, about her. Challenging the visibility of an arrest record found 
through search or preventing others (e.g., future employers) from misinterpreting the 
significance of a search result is a complicated and sometimes futile process (Crawford 
and Schulz, 2013; National Consumer Law Center, 2013).  
Theme #3: Little access to adequate solutions 
Lack of meaningful privacy choices. As mentioned above, marginal users often 
accessed the Internet with of-the-moment needs. Searching for more secure or privacy-
protecting Internet platforms or services was not an option. Users also lacked the digital 
literacy skills needed to avail themselves of privacy-enhancing technologies. Most 
students observed in the classroom struggled with basic tasks, such as launching 
applications or typing a url into a Web browser, versus into a search field of a search 
engine Web page. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that marginal users shared 
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information, such as in scenarios described above, with little awareness of why 
information should be collected, how it is used, or whether users should refrain from 
sharing.  
Given research detailing the inscrutability or inefficacy of user agreements for 
average consumers (Macdonald and Cranor, 2008; Grossklags and Acquisti, 2008), it is 
also unsurprising that marginal Internet users ignored privacy policies or terms of service 
agreements that they encountered. When signing up for email, and in spite of instructors’ 
advice to “carefully review” user agreements, students clicked through or past privacy 
policies and terms of service in order to complete the registration, suggesting these 
notification mechanisms functioned as meaningless accessories to the new learner’s 
Internet experience.  
Push back and resignation. For some marginal users, the threat of insecurity and 
risk made them abandon the Internet, limit use, or ask others to use the Internet for them. 
Some marginal Internet users felt unsure of how to best protect themselves and their 
personal networks (friends and family, especially children) or avoid harmful situations. 
Expectations of pervasive digital surveillance or low levels of online privacy prompted 
others to not adopt the Internet, to go online infrequently, or to limit types of online 
interactions. As one older adult at the senior center recounted, websites “try to extract 
some information that I don’t really want to give up. They want too much info about you. 
They always want to know your birth date, your age, gender. So, I limit my use of 
computers.” Another individual at the social movement organization balked at Gmail’s 
request for cell phone information during its account registration process. “I don’t want 
an email,” he said. “This is too much.”  
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Computers and the Internet raised palpable concerns for many users, even as they 
learned new skills. Between the prospect of having one’s identity stolen—an issue that 
surfaced in both class observations and group discussions with staff—to receiving 
unsolicited ads for services and products not needed, to being watched by government, to 
being hacked, some felt they could never feel safe or protected online and chose to 
moderate their use, use the Internet by proxy (such as a child or grandchild), or avoid use 
altogether. For those who expressed anxiety about “all the bad things,” most felt resigned 
and helpless. One student said, “We weren’t warned ahead of time what this was going to 
be like.” As another expressed, “You’re just going to have to live with it.” 
Discussion: Making Sense of Privacy-Poor, Surveillance-Rich Broadband Adoption 
Digital inclusion and issues of privacy and surveillance interact in complex ways. 
Despite the framing found in some governmental studies of privacy and broadband 
adoption, most users’ interests in privacy or surveillance did not stand in stark opposition 
to their interest in broadband. Adopting the Internet did not, for the most part, involve a 
binary choice. In this study, people “on the wrong side of the digital divide” did not have 
the luxury of letting privacy or surveillance concerns dictate choices about how to adopt 
and interact with digital technologies: marginal users had no choice but to depend upon 
broadband.  
While this study was not designed to show systematic effects of “privacy poor, 
surveillance rich broadband” on marginal users, its findings demonstrate the complexity 
of digital inclusion: being included means participation in the potentially harmful 
consequences arising from inappropriate and asymmetric flows of information.  
The findings point to three factors shaping marginal users’ norms and 
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expectations: 
The importance of context 
The discovery of marginal users’ concerns should come as no surprise given their 
sociohistorical context. As Nissenbaum (2010) has outlined, such context plays a critical 
role in shaping information-sharing norms and expectations that users bring with them as 
they adopt new technologies. Different from Nissenbaum’s focus on privacy, however, 
the stories and sentiments raised here suggest many norms and expectations pertain to 
surveillance and corresponding questions of control (or the lack thereof), and not just 
appropriateness of information flows. Marginal Internet users have endured the prying 
eye of government officials or authorities, have witnessed others categorize and target 
them, and expose themselves in order to get by in life. They have been, in some sense, 
watched by default. Those anxieties and concerns are transposed to the context of 
learning about broadband technologies and, in turn, influence the kinds of activities that 
marginal users feel uncomfortable pursuing online—such as emailing a government 
official or shopping online. Those same anxieties and concerns also constrain individual 
agency—for example, you might divulge personal details (to a so-called free resume 
service) in desperation while searching for a job.  
Constraints of the learning environment 
The ways in which marginal Internet users become familiar with the Internet, its 
platforms, and services also contributed to norm- and expectation-setting. On the one 
hand, digital literacy classes primarily focused on skills, not broad understanding. So, 
marginal users do not learn how information about oneself travels in a networked 
communications infrastructure, what controls individuals have over that process, or what 
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impact one’s digital profile or digital footprint has on the way others—employers, banks, 
learning institutions, law enforcement, retailers, and more—interact with you. So, while 
they might avoid shopping online or emailing government officials, processes of 
information sharing, aggregation, analysis, and targeting remain invisible or opaque. And 
while marginal users might bring concerns up in class, staff demonstrated limited 
capacity to answer questions or provide tips and counsel users.  
Technologies’ normalizing impact 
Technologies themselves play a role in setting marginal users’ experience of 
privacy or surveillance online. As seen in the case of the student whose arrest record 
surfaced after a simple search engine exercise, marginal users join a Web that makes their 
lives hypervisible, not an anonymous Web that hides their digital traces or digitized 
selves. Moreover, marginal users join a Web that requires them to register for accounts 
with real names, be it a public assistance program, a job search assistant, or email. As 
several privacy scholars have argued (Solove, 2002; Battelle, 2005; Ohm, 2010), the 
tethering of people to real name identities or account registration begs the question of 
whether individuals have adequate control over information flows. Once a company 
requires log-in credentials, it can rifle through the data trail that one has created, alter 
data, draw inferences about people, or expose one’s data to harmful or risky scenarios.   
In this sense, the technologies create the conditions for types of information flows 
which the marginal user may have little ability to understand, discover, or manipulate. 
The way that broadband technologies are introduced to new users makes the divulging of 
personal details appear normal and second nature.   
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Conclusion: Accounting for Digital Inclusion’s Downside 
The technosocial factors described above contribute to a complicated portrait of 
digital harms and digital opportunities. In a binary conception of privacy versus adoption, 
the user simply rejects broadband technologies. In a more complex scenario described 
here, the user adopts broadband technologies with both hope and resignation: a hope that 
learning how to use email and surf the Web, for example, will lead to better jobs, and 
resignation that she will encounter some of the same predatory targeting she has 
experienced before.  
In addition, this study points to an interaction between low digital literacy and 
behaviors that heighten the potential for harm. As mentioned above, marginal users could 
not easily detect bad or illegitimate actors, struggled to perform basic Internet tasks, 
failed to distinguish between advertisements and content, and failed to understand the 
difference between being logged in and logged out. These activities left marginal users 
exposed and vulnerable to various forms of profiling (e.g., committed by corporate, 
government, or bad actors) that target unwitting users for both intentionally and 
unintentionally harmful purposes.  
The study also shows an interaction between social status of marginalized 
individuals and a particular type of Internet tailored for and targeted at the marginal user. 
As suggested in the example of a student discovering her arrest records during a search 
engine exercise, the Internet (and the society of users that interacts with it) “sees” the 
marginal user in a specific way, as an individual whose most important digital 
instantiation is one that pertains to incarceration. And while the Internet “sees” all 
individuals in particular ways, marginalized populations are less likely to have the means 
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to meaningfully challenge these profiles (see Pasquale, 2014). In the future, additional 
research is needed to better understand sorting processes that categorize marginal users 
and fuel algorithmic determinations of their digital reputations, whether for ads, credit 
scores or other “worthiness” scores, and content. 
The Role of Policy in Addressing Privacy-Poor Broadband 
While these critiques might seem to fault the institutions providing digital literacy 
and public Internet, they are really an indictment of broader and systemic failures in 
technology policy. First, digital inclusion policies, from conventional efforts at the FCC 
and NTIA to lesser known initiatives at the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Department of Education, and Federal Reserve, have failed to address privacy in a 
meaningful way that prepares and protects vulnerable populations from the harmful 
aspects of “being digital.” Second, privacy policies, which emanate from a patchwork of 
regulatory agencies focused on context-specific privacy (health, education, finance, 
consumer protection, etc.), neglect accessibility questions. The notice-and-consent 
regime, which undergirds much of privacy regulation, assumes equal ability and 
resources on the part of users and seldom addresses disadvantaged individuals with low 
digital literacy levels. Third, innovation policies that pertain to the research and 
development of secure and privacy-enhancing technologies also neglect considerations of 
the marginal user (see also Gangadharan, 2013; Gangadharan et al., 2013). Altogether, 
the development of laws, regulations, or new technologies would benefit those in greatest 
need of protection. 
Though all three kinds of policies will contribute to better outcomes for marginal 
users, digital inclusion policies may offer the most hope. As noted by the Federal Trade 
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Commission (2014) in a comment to the FCC, the FCC has sufficient authority under 
Title 1, Section 706 of the Communications Act to ensure that privacy and security are 
core features of broadband deployment and adoption efforts. In short, an opportunity 
exists to marry privacy-enhancing interests with universal broadband goals, as the FCC 
evolves its regulatory oversight over information services (Stoller, 2014). 
Towards Meaningful Digital Inclusion 
The organizations that help users adopt broadband routinely engage in processes 
of setting cultural norms, expectations, and social practices related to the use and non-use 
of digital technologies. These “digital stewards” answer timely and urgent needs and 
have the power to steer marginal users to consider a range of solutions. The right 
regulatory policies can ensure frontline personnel adequately address marginal users’ 
privacy and surveillance concerns. 
Marginal users should not have to choose between going online and feeling safe, 
secure, and free from surveillance. Underserved communities want to benefit from 
broadband access and wish to partake in the same opportunities afforded by digital 
technology to other populations. Policies to bridge the digital divide can enable their 
hopes of reaping the positive benefits of digital inclusion. But until regulators make a 
strategic effort to do so, this study points to the inadequacy of digital literacy programs in 
addressing privacy and surveillance concerns of marginal users and helping users to 
understand the nature of information sharing and information flows online.
                                                 
1
 Examples of corporate-supported digital inclusion programs include 
internetessentials.com, everyoneon.org, getonlineathome.org, 
http://wikikc.org/Digital_Inclusion. 
2
 See http://www.alexa.com/. 
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3
 The FCC interpreted the primary reasons according to a different logic than the raw 
rankings enumerated here: it grouped affordability-related explanations (30 percent of 
non-users, the first reason); grouped comfort and risk reasons together as “digital 
literacy” (28 percent, the second reason); and, identified “relevance” (14 percent, the 
third reason). 
4
 The reason for the dearth in attention to privacy by practitioners is an important object 
of study, though beyond the scope of this paper. 
5
 The author contacted a number of organizations involved in digital literacy work, 
including organizations funded by BTOP, to advertise the study and invite organizations 
to participate. Five organizations agreed to participate in the study, though one of the 
groups—an organization that provided digital storytelling and digital literacy training to 
students and members of immigrant populations—became financially unstable and 
ceased to exist. Only adult populations were recruited for participation.  
6
 One group requested that one-on-one interviews form part of the production process for 
the learning tool. 
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